An objective interpretation of the testimony received by the committee indicates that human and race relations, though far from ideal prior to the November 3 incident, suffered more from the aftermath than from the event itself. Many in Greensboro saw these responses as defensive and repressive. In any case, city officials appeared to be out of touch with an appreciable segment of the community, both black and white. If anyone had the impression that all was well in Greensboro, that progress in human relations had been optimum, that concern for the poor and the persons of limited access were being adequately addressed, November 3 and its aftermath clearly dispelled this notion.

Many people in Greensboro, and indeed the community as a whole, were traumatized by the events of Nov. 3, 1979, and have suffered, largely in silence. From the day of the shootings through the end of the three trials and the completion of several government-commissioned reports to the declaration in 2003 of this truth and reconciliation process, there has been evidence of pain that has gone unaddressed. This chapter traces the various efforts, and silences, on the part of the City of Greensboro, former CWP members and other activists, white supremacist organizations and other Greensboro community members to acknowledge, learn from and respond to people harmed by this tragic event.

**Initial City response**

With state and federal law enforcement agencies assisting the Greensboro Police Department (GPD), the City of Greensboro’s elected government, city manager’s office and public safety officials reacted quickly and strongly on their fears that chaos and more violence were imminent dangers following Nov. 3, 1979. Actions included declaring a state of emergency that would allow wider leeway for searches and the seizure of any weapons, setting roadblocks and restricting access to neighborhoods along the route and around college campuses, heavy surveillance along the route in days leading up to the CWP’s funeral march held Nov. 11, 1979, insisting on a City-prepared route for the marchers, enacting a curfew, setting up a “rumor control center,” urging residents to stay away from the funeral march through television and radio public service announcements, and calling out the National Guard for that march. Local business leaders, hospitals, emergency transportation services and college security forces were among those contacted in regards to security for the march; the sale of liquor and weapons was temporarily banned prior to the march.

Reflecting on those days immediately after the shootings, former Mayor John Forbis recalled being “camped out at city hall” with the then-current Mayor Jim Melvin:

*There were several areas in the community where some of the antagonists, and I’m not talking about the Klan, I’m talking about some of the other folks, were stockpiling weapons. There was a case of the new tennis-ball-sized hand-grenades missing from Fort Bragg – a search of a dormitory at Duke University uncovered two of them. And these people were intending to come to Greensboro to participate in a march. So, you know, one of those things in a trash can in the Coliseum would make a tidy little mess.*

*And there were several fires attempted in grocery stores and other buildings in and around the black community at night. ... So there was a lot more going on in the community. We avoided two bombings. We drank four thousand gallons of coffee just trying to stay, you know,*
In addition to concerns that more violence could follow the shootings, city officials exhibited a great deal of concern over Greensboro’s image in the national and international media. U.S. Rep. Richardson Preyer told members of the House just days following, that the violence of Nov. 3, 1979, “was entirely out of character for the Greensboro community. The city has had a proud history of nonviolent demonstrations during the civil rights era.” In a Nov. 23, 1979, Greensboro Daily News article, Mayor Jim Melvin is quoted, “This whole thing turned into a media event. For a period of 54 straight hours our community was spotlighted by the world press.” In the article, author Jim Schlosser goes on to say, “The mayor and others at City Hall are worried about the damage the city’s reputation may have suffered because of massive publicity on the shootings. They are outraged that some national publications choose to portray Greensboro as a racially troubled city.”

One of the primary concerns seems to have been the impact the events would have on companies considering new locations. Executive director of the Greensboro Chamber of Commerce in 1979, John Parramore said:

The companies we are working with know enough about the true character of our community and are in a position to understand what really happened here. The damage comes from the companies we don’t know about and who might not contact us because of this ... In our dealings with people from outside Greensboro, we are trying to emphasize our city was an unfortunate victim to outsiders and that Greensboro rallied together after the incident.

Melvin told the Greensboro Record that he believed that race relations in Greensboro improved in the immediate aftermath of the violence.

I think all of this has pulled the entire community together ... Dialogues are taking place between groups that have not been that close in the past. Feelings and concerns are being expressed that perhaps have been overlooked in the past.

Others disagreed. “I don’t think five people can be shot down on the streets of the city and you can just walk away from it,” said Bobby Doctor, regional director of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. “The problem of race relations in the city of Greensboro is going to undergo a lot of scrutiny in coming weeks.” George Simkins, president of the Greensboro chapter of the NAACP, agreed. He said, “A lot of (black residents) feel hostile to the police force because they did not provide the protection necessary to prevent the incident.”

Candy Clapp, who was living in Morningside Homes when the killings happened, five days before her 16th birthday, reported a feeling other than hostility in the aftermath of the shootings. The fear she describes has been echoed by many other former Morningside Homes residents.

After the smoke cleared it was a silence. There was a stillness in the air. We knew people were dead. It was the creepiest thing that any little girl or adult should have to go through. I still have fear of crowds because of what happened that day. We didn’t have a clue what we would see the next day. It was like the children didn’t matter to the City of Greensboro. They knew we were there, but they didn’t seem to care. Nobody came back from the City to question about what we were feeling, what our feelings were after the killings. Nobody but the church could tell us anything to make it better, and preachers could only tell us to hold on to our faith, God would make it better. God would handle it.
What happened after November 3, 1979?

The schools didn’t do anything to support us. Nobody seemed to care how we were affected. We had to go to school the following Monday. We were expected to function and be focused. And some of us couldn’t. There were rumors that the Klan was going to blow up the gas line running through Morningside Homes so we were afraid to sleep at night.

After November third the police treated us like we had committed a crime, like we had killed the Communist Workers on November the third. We were put on curfew. There were helicopters. There were tons of police. We were in a war zone. We were treated like prisoners in our own community. The police threatened to put us in jail if we broke curfew.19

While city officials managed to prevent further physical violence in the aftermath of Nov. 3, 1979, they did nothing to strengthen trust or race relations. In fact, their focus on the city’s image as opposed to concern for the most vulnerable in the city created more distrust.

Initial grassroots response

There was a strong tension between feelings of fear and hostility about the shootings and the City’s handling of them, both on a local and national level. Locally, the shooting victims’ family members had a difficult time finding a funeral home that would make funeral arrangements for the deceased.20 Describing his personal experiences with the national response, Rev. Cardes Brown recalled:

The Pulpit Forum especially was constantly being contacted by persons who had viewed this footage ... this was the actual footage and people around the nation had seen it. I remember being called by (Southern Christian Leadership Conference leader) Joseph Lowery to meet with me several times. I talked to Jesse Jackson and different ones who wanted to do something. We talked about a mobilization.

Being very honest with you, there was a time when the city was divided, but even within the clergy there was a division. There were those who felt that I was too outspoken and speaking too candidly about it and they wanted me to be quiet, and actually suggested that I be impeached. There was a resistance to allowing any organizations to come in. The SCLC wanted to come in, but the ministers had said, “Don’t try this. This is not going to happen. We don’t need any outsiders.” So the distortions that had been created made even persons within the city ... other black pastors who were reluctant to get involved (said) “just leave it alone.”21

Organizers from around the city, state and country who were not scared into silence by the shootings were inspired to initiate a national coalition-building movement to demonstrate publicly a broad condemnation of the hate and violence for which the Klan and Nazis stood. The Pulpit Forum of Greensboro and Vicinity, the state chapter of the ACLU, the Equal Rights Congress and Durham-based Southeast Regional Economic Justice Network discussed building a coalition and hosting a rally on Nov. 18, 1979.

During the same period, the CWP was planning its funeral march to honor and bury the victims on Nov. 11, 1979. Members had announced plans to be fully armed to protect themselves given that the police had not protected them on Nov. 3, 1979. Nelson Johnson explained their rationale in Sally Bermanzohn’s book, Through Survivors’ Eyes: “We said we would never again put ourselves in the position of being disarmed by the police and then gunned down. We would not rely on the police to
defend us.” This position and others like it played into the hands of those who viewed the CWP as a dangerous threat.

**Community Relations Service counter-response**

The Community Relations Service (CRS) was established as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “to provide assistance to communities and persons therein in resolving disputes, disagreements or difficulties relating to discriminatory practices based on race, color or national origin.” The CRS sent a “conciliation” team to Greensboro after Nov. 3, 1979.

Pat Bryant of the Institute for Southern Studies investigated the CRS for a 1980 article in *Southern Exposure*, the institute’s magazine. The article criticized the CRS for gathering information on the legal activities of many Americans, in part through a “spider web of city, county and state ‘human relations councils’ (that form) an essential part of the CRS operation – both the gathering of intelligence and the dispensing of rumors and threats.”

Bryant suggests there is some evidence that the Greensboro CRS team participated in both – gathering intelligence and dispensing of rumors and threats – in the aftermath of Nov. 3, 1979, using tactics including red-baiting, rumor-mongering and intimidation. It started before plans for the funeral march and for the Nov. 18, 1979, gathering. According to Bryant: “The (conciliation) team’s mission, ostensibly, was to help maintain civil order, but the actual effect of its activity was to sow seeds of dissension.”

Bryant cites the work of the CRS team, led by a U.S. Department of Justice agent named Robert Ensley, to “keep tabs on the college student population.”

> Ensley’s first task – a relatively simple one – was to discourage local college students (mainly at A&T State University) from participating in the Nov. 11 march. Most of the students were anxious to express their outrage over the murders, yet they feared further violence and, very often, were leery of becoming involved with a Communist group. Ensley’s message played on those fears. Lyn Wells, a Southern Conference Educational Fund (SCEF) organizer, recalls that Ensley told the A&T students, “Oh, we’re not telling you not to take a position. We’re not telling you not to march. We just want to tell you that on Sunday there will be 5,000 National Guardsmen, there may be a state of emergency – and all of the guns will be aimed at you.”

In her statement at the GTRC’s second hearing, Leah Wise recalled that Wells herself became a target when the CRS told people she was a Communist.

> Another major opposition that we encountered in doing this ... came from the Community Relations Service of the United States Justice Department. They played a role in red-baiting the initial organizers. We, within about two weeks’ time, tried to do a demonstration in Greensboro. ... the CRS came with a dossier on Lynn Wells, whom I had known when she was an activist in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee; she’d been involved in other activities since that time. Basically, they red-baited her, and the core group of ministers who were in support of that effort backed out, and so, that demonstration, you know, went “poof.”

In a February 1980 editorial, the Carolina Peacemaker wrote: “Between the activities of the Justice Department’s Community Relations Service and Greensboro’s Human Relations Office, under the
direction of City Hall, enough fear and distrust in the form of red-baiting was spread to cause a disintegration of the fragile coalition building towards Nov. 18.”

**Mill workers react**

Virginia Turner, who worked in White Oak Mill from 1979 to 1990, recalled at the Commission’s second public hearing her reaction and that of her co-workers to the killings of union organizers.

*The day of November third I woke up to the news on TV about a shooting in Morningside Homes. My first thought was really disbelief. I really couldn’t imagine, and my first thought was, “Oh my God, that is us,” and I say us because we were a union. I think our minds and our bodies went into shock. I mean, if electrical shock is what it feels like, then I think this was it.*

*Inside the mill was devastation. I mean everybody was wondering, and looking and trying to find answers and asking what happened and there were no answers. As time passed, the union seemed to lose its strength. I felt our thumbs had been taken out of our mouths and a pacifier put in, and we’ve been sucking air for a long time. That day, a dark cloud came over Greensboro, and to this day, 25 years later, I feel that we’re still waiting for the sun to come out.*

*(After the shootings) I think the union became weak. I think people lost their desire to be a part of union. The union just, it seemed like after shootings the union became a part of Cone Mill. It was times when we felt like the union was not giving us good representation.*

Henry Graham Dail, manager of security and safety at Cone Mills, said that the management feared violence in the mills after the killings.

*After Nov. 3 there were rumors that the plant would be blown up and violence against the employees. Workers refused to come to work. We thought it was the people involved in shootings … The only one I remember is Nelson Johnson. But I guess also the others that were affiliated with them or who also agreed with their philosophies.*

*… Workers expressed concern that people would come and take revenge against them. We were concerned there would be confrontations. We added additional guards, and had guards to protect key management people. The guards at White Oak were on horses because the property was large.*

**White supremacists react**

On Dec. 16, 1979, the Klan held a fundraiser, attended by an estimated 100, to help defend 14 men who were charged in connection with the deaths on Nov. 3, 1979. In addition to raising $217 for the cause, they marched, in robes with lighted torches, around a 30-foot high cross chanting “God, country, Klan.” One of the participants, also a caravan member on Nov. 3, was Renee Hartsoe, the 17-year old wife of Terry Wayne Hartsoe, one of the 14 charged with murder. At the fundraiser, Renee Hartsoe predicted that the men would be given “fair trial” saying that “people in Greensboro are pretty much on the Klan side … It is bad that it happened but white people need to wake up.”
At the same event, Virgil Griffin, the Mount Holly, N.C.-based Imperial Wizard of the Invisible Knights of the KKK, told audience members they should “stand up and fight communism … It’s time to wake up and fight for America. We’re not bowing down to communism.”

On Feb. 26, 1980, the North Carolina Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights conducted “an open, fact-finding meeting to inquire about the status of race relations in the city of Greensboro” (more information below). Among those who spoke were Griffin and Harold Covington, national leader of the National Socialist Party of America (Nazi Party). Griffin’s statement to the Committee described the Klan at war with a new enemy:

> Asked if he maintained that the enemy is no longer the blacks, Mr. Griffin reiterated that the enemy was the Communist Party, adding, the same enemy against whom thousands of soldiers lost their lives in fighting the Viet Nam and Korea wars. He maintained that Communist parties were all over the state, and that their plan to take over North Carolina called for attacking the Klan as a strategy for turning the blacks to their side: “to get the blacks, we’re (the Communist) going to attack the Ku Klux Klan.” He stated that if attacked, the Klan would fight back, maintaining that the government should have more respect for those who lost limbs and lives in Viet Nam than to permit the Communist Party to “run up and down the streets of Greensboro flying the Communist flag, rallying to overthrow our government.”

Covington, who, like Griffin, maintained that the Klan and Nazis intended only a peaceful counterdemonstration on Nov. 3, 1979, said both groups had had their rights violated “right, left and center.” Covington essentially threatened the Greensboro community:

> Covington protested that the arrest of 14 men by the Greensboro police had been in violation of their rights, adding that the main reason he was appearing at the hearing was to let everyone know they would not rest until those 14 innocent men were returned to their families. He said that although they had been bending over backwards not to irritate Greensboro citizenry, that if those men, who had only been defending themselves, were sent to prison, “then we intend to make Greensboro a center for National Socialist agitation.” He reminded the panel that the national headquarters of the Nazi Party is to be moved to North Carolina – probably Raleigh. If the 14 are sent to prison, he concluded, “you’re going to have Nazis coming out of your ears.” …

> … Covington said what had happened in Greensboro proved that the races cannot get along and that integration is a costly failure. …

> He maintained that bringing black people here as slaves was “a horrible mistake” which should not be compounded by “trying to force them into our society,” but should be corrected by “sending them back to their own land.”

**The funeral march – Nov.11, 1979**

After an initial announcement by then-City Manager Tom Osborne that the City would not issue any parade permits “until further notice,” he later allowed that the Funeral March did not need a parade permit, because funeral processions are automatically allowed, whether in cars or on foot. “You simply
can’t deny people a funeral,’” Police Chief Swing said.\(^{39}\) City government and law-enforcement officials responded to the CWP’s plan for its funeral march with a high-profile security plan that included some 500 National Guardsmen to supplement 400 on-duty state and local law enforcement personnel.\(^{40}\)

In declaring a 24-hour state of emergency the day before the march,\(^{41}\) law enforcers added restrictions to civil liberties that already had included prohibitions against demonstrations of any kind and a moratorium on permits to buy hand guns. The state of emergency also made other acts illegal such as “clustering” in neighborhoods, buying gasoline not pumped directly into a vehicle’s tank or carrying weapons of any kind. The lobby of the post office was closed and extra security was present at all entrances of N.C. A&T.\(^{42}\) This was accompanied by an influx of FBI agents.

Under a 24-hour search warrant, issued by Superior Court Judge Douglas Albright, all cars with out-of-state plates and all other “suspicious” vehicles were stopped and searched.\(^{43}\) Thirty-five people in a CWP caravan from Durham were arrested on the outskirts of town for carrying dangerous weapons during a state of emergency. The GPD reported that it seized 18 guns from this caravan.\(^{44}\) A police department list of people arrested and weapons seized lists 29 arrested for weapons and curfew violations, and 39 guns seized.\(^{45}\)

The Greensboro Daily News and the Greensboro Record articles leading up to the march focused on the CWP’s promise to be armed and reflected widespread tension and fear of another violent clash. Irwin Smallwood, Greensboro Daily News managing editor at the time, said he can’t recall the paper ever taking greater care with a story because of its volatility.\(^{46}\) Gary Cepnick, news editor for the local WFMY station, recalled immediately after the shooting that he felt pressure from the City not to show the footage of the shootings. He recalled a visit from top City officials:

*The mayor and the police chief and the public safety officer and a deputy were all in the lobby and were wanting to come back to the newsroom and wanted to talk to us. Well, I’m in the middle of trying to get this program on the air ... so they come back to the newsroom ... the thrust of the conversation was, “Do we really think it is necessary to put this on the air ... isn’t it going to do more harm than good?”*

*... It was a very intimidating group. I was incredulous. I looked at them and I said, “I think you need to look at this from the perspective that this has been on the radio and it has been reported. People are aware ... that it is going on and we are going to report it. We are going to put it on television. We were there. We witnessed it, we have footage that shows what happened. And we’re going to air it. And I’m sorry if you don’t agree with that, but you are not going to dictate editorial policy to us. I respect what you are telling me here, but we’re not going to...”*

*“But you are going to incite a riot.”*

*“Well we’ll have to take the chance. And we’ll have to live with that. We’ll have to live with the results of whatever happens. The public does have a right to know ... This is something that people now want to know because they’ve heard about it. If they want to tune in and watch this they can judge for themselves ... would you like to be interviewed?”*

*They didn’t. I don’t recall having the mayor on the air that night, but they expressed concern, but basically we went with the story itself without City reaction, without police reaction.*\(^{47}\)

The Revolutionary Worker, the newspaper of the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP), also wrote
extensively about Nov. 3, 1979, and its aftermath, despite the fact that the group had ideological differences with the CWP that had caused at least one clash – fisticuffs outside a mill both groups were trying to organize (See Planning chapter). The *Revolutionary Worker* portrayed the *Greensboro Daily News* and the *Greensboro Record* coverage, and law enforcement efforts around the march, as part of a campaign of fear to keep people away from the funeral march.

> A raging debate boiled in the factories and neighborhoods, especially among Black people, about whether or not to go to the march. The cold threats of violence pulled many people away who were afraid there would be another massacre.  

City officials contributed to this fear by broadcasting public service radio and television announcements urging people to stay away from the march. In addition, a rumor control center, managed by city staff, was installed to respond to citizens’ concerns; and in the three days leading up to the march, fielded over 3,000 calls. The call center was reactivated the following Thursday, in anticipation of the Nov. 18 march.  

On the day of the funeral march, the *Revolutionary Worker* described the scene:

> Downtown Greensboro was a virtual armed camp, where people were frisked once, twice, sometimes three times in several blocks walking from their cars to the rally site. Standing at attention on both sides of the hearses were rows of policemen with riot shotguns ready. Squads of National Guardsmen were blocking every intersection, with reserves in armored personnel carriers nearby. Undercover cops with walkie-talkies were swarming inside the gathering crowd. These combined cops outnumbered the demonstrators at least 2 to 1.  

Marty Nathan recalled her experience in *Through Survivors’ Eyes*:

> I walked next to Mike’s casket. Next to me was this young National Guardsman, he wasn’t mean, but he had a gun with a bayonet that he kept pointing at my head. I felt like that characterized what my life was – walking through the street with this bayonet pointed at me, on and on and on, through freezing rain, not particularly caring, just knowing that I had to be there. I knew that there was a purpose to all this, that it was important to fight. But there was no joy left. Michael was gone.  

Somewhere between 400 and 1,000 CWP members and supporters participated in the march, along with nearly 1,000 law-enforcement officers and some 200 reporters.  

Capt. Larry Gibson commanded the police presence at the funeral. He recalled,

> The state attorney general’s office got involved. I know the city manager got involved ... There was a lot of discussion as to whether or not the CWP was going to be allowed to carry weapons or not and I was told that the North Carolina Attorney General had said they could. I wasn’t going to buck the North Carolina Attorney General, but they weren’t going to carry loaded weapons or he could come down here and command it and I was going home. They were allowed to carry them, I believe Signe Waller was allowed to carry a shotgun, but it was broken open. It was unloaded and we checked it. Can you imagine if someone had fired a shot? It would have been bad. I thought it was a bad decision, but it wasn’t mine. I had to do what they told me to do. Once the chief said to do it, I had no choice.  

Although the CWP had determined to carry loaded weapons, they compromised and agreed to carry
What happened after November 3, 1979?

unloaded rifles.

Trust was completely broken down between the police and march participants. The CWP did not trust the city to protect the marchers and feared another police snare. At the gravesite, marchers conducted their ceremony in raw, drizzly weather. Although cold, wet and tired afterward, they refused to ride back to town in city-provided buses but instead trekked back on foot. On the return march, people were fearful of being attacked and shot at, but they were even more fearful of getting on a city bus under police supervision. The city behaved throughout as the aggrieved party.\(^54\)

If trust was broken down between the CWP and the police, the CWP’s behavior at the funeral march also drove what would become a growing wedge between itself and other organizations trying to be supportive, including the RCP. “Unfortunately,” the *Revolutionary Worker* wrote, “the CWP doesn’t understand much about building a united front,” noting that members forced all march participants to get rid of any banners or slogans other than CWP slogans.\(^55\)

That behavior, as well as other factors including national CWP leader Jerry Tung’s eulogy in which he referred to the five people who died as martyrs and urged a CWP 5 Enrollment Drive to honor their deaths, would foreshadow further difficulties the CWP would have in its attempts to work with other groups, both locally and nationally.

*We must make the deaths of the CWP 5 the costliest deaths the U.S. bourgeoisie ever inflicted. We have learned to fight, and we will continue to fight, to deal more punishing and more deadly blows to the bourgeoisie. The proletarian revolution is the greatest struggle in human history. There is no other way for us to uplift our class to be the masters of our own society except to learn warfare through actual warfare. A bloodbath in the class struggle for the seizure of state power is inevitable. Active preparation in all forms of struggle, including military defensive armed struggle now is the only way to minimize our casualties in the upcoming bloodbath.

Yes, in the final analysis, the practice of our party’s correct and militant line, and indeed the party itself, can only be forged by blood – by sacrificing the most sacred of all things – our lives.\(^56\)

**Mobilizing against the Klan**

Many activists viewed what happened on Nov. 3, 1979, as being much bigger than Greensboro and bigger than the CWP. In the words of an editorial in the city’s African-American newspaper, the *Carolina Peacemaker*;

*The Klan struck in Greensboro in a manner that demanded response. A number of people from around the nation mobilized for a response; neither the Atlanta conference nor the mobilization for the February 2 march originated with the CWP, both concepts were born of people and forces with no relation to the CWP.*\(^57\)

Although the Nov. 18, 1979, march did not take place, community responses, largely in opposition to the Klan and racist violence, continued through December of 1979 and beyond. They included the following:

- the formation, locally, of the mostly white Citizens for Justice and Unity;
an interfaith and interracial “Union” worship service on Dec. 2, 1979, voicing opposition to all violence and calling for healing within the community, featuring an address by then-N.C. Rep. Henry E. Frye, who spoke mostly about the resurgence of the Klan;

• a forum about the shootings at the Uhuru Bookstore; and

• a conference in Atlanta involving the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organizations (IFCO) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) about strategies for combating the Klan, at which attendees agreed to longtime activist Anne Braden’s suggestion for a national rally in Greensboro.

At the GTRC’s second public hearing, Dr. Larry Morse, an A&T economics professor who was out of town on Nov. 3, 1979, but was friends with the rally organizers, recalled his community’s response.

"I was a member of Citizens for Justice and Unity, a group that sprang up in the immediate aftermath of Nov. 3rd. The group, composed primarily of whites, wanted to express our horror and outrage and indignation at the killings. In late December 1979, on a Saturday or Sunday, we had a rally, an afternoon rally at the governmental plaza. I served as moderator. As I recall, our message was twofold: we were horrified by the killings, and wanted the killings never to happen again, certainly not in our city."\(^{58}\)

Roy Innis, chairman of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) at the time the nation’s largest civil rights organization, said, “We do not agree on all issues with the CWP nor do we agree on some of their political views, however, this issue, the KKK, goes beyond our differences. All freedom fighters regardless of their color, philosophy or religious beliefs must be opposed to racist hate groups such as the KKK and the Nazi Party.”\(^{59}\)

Members of other organizations expressed similar feelings. Leah Wise was the lead organizer of the National Anti-Klan Network, a coalition made up of civil rights and church organizations begun at that Atlanta meeting in response to Nov. 3, 1979. She said,

"Nov 3rd really kicked the movement community out of their sectarian rut, which is one of the things we had fallen into. And folks began talking who hadn’t been talking to each other because of ideological differences all over the country. But, sort of immediately phone calls were happening in the Deep South, with people in Detroit, with people in New York – I mean, everybody saw this as something so dangerous, such a wake up call, that all the differences we had had, it was time to put them down. That is, except the CWP."\(^{60}\)

The rally conceived by Anne Braden at the Atlanta conference was timed and located both to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the start of the national Sit-In Movement at Greensboro’s Woolworth’s lunch counter, and to decry the Nov. 3, 1979, violence. Two decades later, Braden wrote about it in “A Cry for Unity:"

“The massacre of anti-Klan demonstrators on the streets of Greensboro, North Carolina, by Klansmen and Nazis on November 3, 1979, and the protest march that brought 10,000 people there on February 2, 1980, produced a major turning point in this nation’s struggle against racism. These events created a new unity among people’s movements and touched off a decade of activism at a critical moment. ... the story of how that movement was built is especially important today, as the nation faces a new wave of racist violence.

"The February 1980 march responding to the Klan attacks was one of the most broad-based
and diverse anti-racist actions ever mobilized in this country, and a symbol of changing times among social change activists. About 60 percent of the marchers were African American, just under 40 percent white. They came from the entire Eastern Seaboard, the South, and the West and represented countless civil rights groups, religious institutions, unions, students and many left political groups. Many of the more than 300 national endorsing organizations had constituencies in the thousands, and despite a curtain of fear that enveloped the city, an estimated 2,000 of the marchers were Greensboro citizens.61

Wise also remembers the mobilization for the Feb. 2, 1980, rally as an important point in history.62 Making it happen was an organizing effort rife with challenges, including the opposition of City leaders, who Wise said were trying to paint a different view of race relations and so wanted to keep people from protesting this violence.63 In a Jan. 25, 1980, Greensboro Record article, Katherine Fulton explained: “City officials . . . see the march as another threat to the peace and the pocketbooks of Greensboro citizens.”64

Coinciding with the efforts to plan the march were city-wide debates about how to protect First Amendment rights and also “limit the cost to the city of protecting parades and reduce the danger of violence in residential areas.” One proposal considered by the City Council required parade sponsors to pay a fee before receiving a permit, if the city determines that extraordinary protection is needed.65 The proposal ultimately was rejected after community leaders, including CWP members, argued that this proposal would prevent groups who could not afford substantial amounts of money from marching, therefore denying their First Amendment rights.66

On Thursday, Jan. 3, 1980, the Anti-Klan Mobilization Committee filed for a march permit for the Feb. 2, 1980, anti-Klan demonstration which they hoped would end at the War Memorial Coliseum. At that time, Coliseum Director Jim Oshust said that the Coliseum was already booked.67

On Jan. 16, 1980, the Greensboro Daily News reported:

At a news conference ... (Lucius) Walker charged some established “economic interests” are paying for a Danville (Va.) promoter to conduct a concert in an attempt to prevent the organizing committee from renting the coliseum.

“Somebody is working against us and apparently some money has passed,” Walker said, attributing his information to “rumors” and a “fairly reliable source” whom he declined to name ...

Lawrence Toller, the Danville, Va., promoter who has rented the coliseum for a rhythm-and-blues concert Tuesday denied receiving any payoffs and said he had not been in contact with anyone in Greensboro except coliseum officials and march organizers.68

Two days later, however, the Greensboro Daily News reported that the City of Greensboro had signed a contact to co-sponsor the concert with Toller to decrease his risk of losing money. Also reported was that a staff attorney with the Center for Constitutional Rights, who was representing march organizers, threatened to file a lawsuit in an attempt to force the City to allow the march to end at the Coliseum.69

March organizers believed that this co-sponsorship was a deliberate attempt on the part of the City
to deny the marchers the use of the Coliseum, while the City’s spokesman claimed that the City was “merely seeking altruistically to help the small black entrepreneur who wants use of the coliseum for a concert and to foster rhythm and blues music in the city.”

Ultimately, City leaders admitted that this agreement was the first time the City had entered into such an arrangement for this type of a show and agreed to postpone the concert by one day so that the march organizers could host their event as they had originally requested. This agreement came only after the march organizers’ attorneys filed a suit against the City for use of the Coliseum and the judge required the City and organizers to sit down and work out an agreement.

Defending the City’s actions, City Manager Tom Osborne explained to the Human Relations Commission on Jan. 23, 1980,

*There’s been no attempt to keep a march from occurring in the City of Greensboro on (Feb. 2, 1980), but only in the route and the point at which the march would terminate, and that is the Coliseum. In both of the applications, this has been the problem on which we could not agree with the applicants. The reason for this, of course, is that in our opinion, the Coliseum for the evening of February 2 is taken ... It was done in good faith and in my opinion was the thing to do. If it’s wrong to uphold what I think are the City’s commitments, then it’s wrong. If we should do what some of the New York based organizations, the Atlanta based organizations, the Communists organizations say we should, and what some of the papers appear to think we should, then we’re wrong.*

The Mobilization Committee identified another source of resistance to the march when it filed a suit on Jan. 29, 1980, asking the court to direct the SBI to “stop harassing and intimidating students organizing for the march.” An example of that intimidation was offered by the committee on behalf of Kelvin Buncum, president of the Student Government Association at N.C. A&T State University, as described in a *Greensboro Daily News* article on Jan. 30:

*Buncum said two A&T security guards, “accompanied by two men who I knew to be agents of the SBI,” attended a Jan. 24 SGA meeting at which participation in the march was discussed. ‘I feel that the presence of campus security and the SBI agents had a chilling effect on the students at the meeting,” Buncum said. “Most have not participated in any further activities with respect to the Feb. 2 march.*

Wise, who also is director of the Durham-based Southeast Regional Economic Justice Network and a founder of North Carolinians Against Religious and Racist Violence, placed the CWP members and their insistence of being armed for self-defense among all the other hindrances organizers faced in mobilizing people for the February 2 march.

*In addition to those efforts by the media, by the City of Greensboro, and by the federal government to squash any attempt by the public to protest the horror of these events and to assert a different image of race relations in the country, there was also the challenge of what I would call the aggressive opportunism of the Communist Workers Party. And why do I say that? Because I think that, in the role of, first of all, having just been declared a Communist Party from the Worker’s Viewpoint Organization; it’s important for those that were not in the movement community to understand that that had very big significance. To them, that meant that they were the leaders of the working class. And so, the martyrdom and victimhood took on a very special role, and what it did was also take on a role where they were beyond criticisms. ... It was really hard to get them to compromise, and to trust the rest of the
What happened after November 3, 1979?

community to have their back.74

IFCO leader Lucius Walker, who balked at even including the CWP when he first came to Greensboro to begin mobilizing in January 1980, was furious when the CWP – wanting to ensure recognition of its involvement – announced the planned rally before he could. Nelson Johnson acknowledged the negative impact of that decision:

Problems developed in the February 2 coalition because the CWP announced the February 2 march before SCLC and IFCO did. That sent IFCO leader Lucius Walker all the way up the wall. And it made it hard for the coalition to come together ... I can’t defend everything CWP did, but it was clear to me that there was an attempt to bury us completely in this united front. I am thoroughly convinced that state machinery was at work to isolate us in Greensboro, and isolate us in any national coalition.75

The main points of contention were the CWP’s insistence on being armed and on pushing its party-building agenda, which was one among many agendas brought by sponsoring organizations and individuals, Wise says.76 She blamed the CWP for prompting some coalition members to back out by breaking an agreement the coalition had worked to create “where the CWP would agree to not publicly announce that they thought they had the right to defend themselves and to carry weapons in the demonstration.”77 Nelson Johnson disputes this characterization and recalls that the agreement was not to have a policy regarding guns one way or the other because the CWP leaders did not feel they could either ask or not ask their membership to come armed.78

In another indication of what CWP members perceived as attempts to isolate them, Marty Nathan and Paul Bermanzohn recall being thrown out of Durham meeting held in preparation for the Feb. 2, 1980, march. Bermanzohn had just gotten out of rehab and was able to walk, very slowly, with a cane.

It was a middle-class neighborhood and there was this lawn that I had to get over. It was January, and slippery. It seemed like it took a half-hour just to get across that lawn. So we finally made it into the house, and then people told us to leave. They threw Marty and me out of a meeting held to protest our being shot! These were people who didn’t want to antagonize the local power structure. This put them in the position of being verbally upset about the murders while they iced us out of the fight back.79

Marty Nathan adds, “There was an increase in this trend to isolate us as victims, to try to maintain a ‘pure’ anti-racist movement not ‘contaminated’ by Communists who had been killed.”80

The dispute over weapons continued all the way through the march itself, Johnson says.

We took the same position on the February 2 march that we had taken on the funeral march about upholding the right of armed self-defense. That led, eventually, to the February 2 coalition taking a vote and putting us out. And we said we did not accept being put out.

On the day of the march, ten thousand marched through Greensboro, led by the widows. Until the very hour of the rally at the Greensboro Coliseum, the coalition leadership’s position was that we would not speak. Our position was that we would speak. Ben Chavis brokered the negotiations while the march was going on. We were all behind the stadium, and Ben was trying to put restrictions on the time, what we would say. 81

Somewhere between 7,000 and 10,000 marchers convened at the end of the march in the Coliseum,
where they heard speeches from several civil rights leaders, including Ben Chavis, Rev. C.T. Vivien, Anne Braden, and Rev. Lucius Walker. Despite the challenges, the rally served as a source of valuable lessons that Wise said organizers now are using. It also served as the impetus for beginning efforts by organizations such as hers and Klanwatch to monitor the Klan and other right-wing hate groups.

OFFICIAL EXAMINATIONS AND FINDINGS

In the aftermath of Nov. 3, 1979, the city’s Human Relations Commission (HRC) “recognized the fact that it had to be about the business of trying to help restore harmony and trust throughout the City in an effort to avert the appearance of racial disunity.”

The HRC established the Citizens Review Committee and the City hired McManis Associates, a management consulting firm, to assess “the manner in which the Greensboro Police Department planned for the rally and parade scheduled for November 3, 1979, and then performed on that day.”

McManis Report Recommendations

1. The City should alter its forms and its procedures concerning application for and issuance of parade permits.

2. The Police Department should establish formal, written planning procedures for parades, demonstrations, and similar events. Such procedures should include the designation of a planning coordinator and the development of a written Operations Plan, including personnel assignments.

3. The Greensboro Police Department should reconsider its recent organizational decision to split its intelligence personnel into two separate units.

4. The Greensboro Police Department should reconsider its new “show of force” policy with respect to coverage of demonstrations and other controversial events.

5. For parades, demonstrations, and similar events where the formal planning process is invoked and a written Operations Plan developed, the Chief of Police should designate a senior command officer as field commander for the operations phase.

6. The field commander should be in the field, where the events are to take place, and should be in constant communication with, and available to, all units subject to his command.

7. In all future situations that warrant development of a written Operations Plan, an after-action analysis and critique should be conducted by the Greensboro Police Department.

8. All after-action critiques should include objective evaluations of individual performances, with appropriate actions taken as a result.

9. The City should proceed with its plan to acquire more sophisticated recording equipment for its communications operations so that all transmissions can be heard on playback.

10. For future planning for potentially serious events, the City of Greensboro should seek an advisory opinion by an appropriate North Carolina legal authority concerning the “stop and frisk” powers of local police.

11. Legal research should be conducted to determine whether or not the City of Greensboro, in the absence of action by the State of North Carolina, can regulate the possession and use of firearms at controversial public assemblages that may lead to disorder.
What happened after November 3, 1979?

Citizens Review Committee Report, May 22, 1980

The Citizens Review Committee was a group of private citizens who volunteered their time and spent several months, working in the evenings, interviewing people and conducting an investigator-less investigation of Nov. 3, 1979, and its aftermath. Michael Curtis, one of the members, said he was always surprised later when the City claimed the event had been investigated and would “point to our little committee.”

In its preface, the committee’s report highlighted the racial realities behind the tragedy.

"The Citizens Review Committee found that a very real problem of segregation and discrimination still has an effect on the lives of citizens in Greensboro. Only a recommitment by the entire community to a dialogue of unity will achieve equal opportunity for all. A view of Greensboro on the part of many citizens is still based on a parochial perception of their own neighborhoods. Only the inter-action of citizens from all neighborhoods will achieve a true sense of community in the City of Greensboro."

The report had earmarks of Greensboro’s characteristic civility. About the police, it said: “The committee commends the Police Department for its efforts to plan to secure the parade. However, it is clear that several unfortunate miscalculations contributed to the violent outcome which ensued.”

The Citizens Review Committee congratulated the police for quick action afterward, for releasing an administrative report right away and for cooperating with its investigation. However, the report did remark that police should have at least followed the Klan-Nazi caravan in marked cars since it was headed into a black neighborhood with guns and malice.

Police had argued, and gotten an opinion from the state attorney general supporting the view, that they had no right to stop the caravan. The committee also criticized the police for relying on intelligence that said any confrontation would happen later in the march, saying in the future that police should “go early and stay late” in such cases.

The Committee found no substance to claims of police conspiracy, “however, testimony before the committee indicates some indifference by some police officers to the welfare of the CWP and the Klan.”

With regard to the Feb. 2, 1980, march, the Committee chastised the City for trying to rewrite its parade ordinance and for trying to block the use of the Coliseum:

"Instead of focusing on ways of preventing illegal acts and acts of violence, the City attempted to discourage the exercise of First Amendment rights. It seriously considered passing a city ordinance which would have made it virtually impossible for any controversial group to have held a parade in the City of Greensboro. To the great credit of the local newspaper and television stations which opposed the ordinance, and to reason which finally prevailed, the ordinance in its most oppressive form was not enacted.

The City’s handing of events leading up to and surrounding the February 2 anti-Klan mobilization was mixed. While the City’s apprehension is understandable, its conduct..."
appeared to many to be an overt effort to block the march.\textsuperscript{99}

The report added that “action by city officials at least created the impression that the city had engaged in a charade in an effort to deny the marchers the use of the Greensboro Coliseum.”\textsuperscript{100}

The report went on to point out how the City’s militant responses hurt race relations.

\begin{quote}
A consequence of the city’s handling of the aftermath of the November 3 tragedy has been the creation of a negative, even distrustful attitude toward city officials. This attitude of distrust extends beyond the black and low-income community. Among many in the City of Greensboro, a feeling persists that the city lacks sensitivity and consistency in dealing with the human and civil rights of all citizens.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
After the November 3 shootings, the City was out of touch with the reaction of many of its citizens to the event. While resources were available to the City through the Police Community Relations unit of the Police Department and the Human Relations Commission, the City, initially at least, appears to have made limited use of these resources.\textsuperscript{101}
\end{quote}

\begin{table}
\textbf{RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CITIZENS REVIEW COMMITTEE}\textsuperscript{92}

Our recommendations are based on our analysis of human and race relations in the City of Greensboro. Some are essentially independent of the events of November 3. We make the following recommendations.

1. The City Council should enact an ordinance prohibiting discrimination and should give the Human Relations Commission the power to go into court to seek injunctive relief in cases where the Human Relations Commission has determined discrimination exists.

2. The Human Relations Commission should be adequately staffed to monitor human and race relations and to possess the capability of in-house research and documentation.

3. Efforts should be made by the City Council and other groups in the City to encourage white participation in events planned and promoted by the City to be held in Southeast Greensboro and black participation in events held in other parts of the City. The City Council and other organizations in the City should provide leadership in an effort to break down the barriers which separate the citizens in our community.

4. The City should take steps to bring about an independent assessment of community performance in the areas of housing, employment, education, and criminal justice. Even though the problems in those areas are difficult and are national as well as local, greater local initiative needs to be taken in attempting to solve these problems.

5. The City should reaffirm its commitment to the right of all groups to exercise their First Amendment rights.

6. Steps should be taken to provide more diverse representation in the City government, acknowledging the socio-economic and racial differences that characterize the citizens of our community. City Council should lead this effort.
\end{table}
7. The staffing and promotion practices of City management and particularly the Police Department must reach and maintain levels of minority employment at all levels of authority as designated in the Affirmative Action Program on file with renewed and special emphasis on the recruitment and promotion of minorities and women within the ranks of sworn police officers.

8. A citizen advisory board, independent of the Police Department, should be established to provide a forum for community-police communication and to provide a forum in which advice to the police and complaints about police conduct could be considered.

9. The police-community relations division of the Police Department should be given a greater role in assessing and communicating community attitudes directly to the Chief of Police. Regular conferences with the Chief of Police should be scheduled for this purpose.

10. In cases which are likely to involve confrontations between groups like the Communist Workers Party, the Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan, police presence should be visible and substantial. The safety of the groups, as well as the safety of the general citizenry, should be of primary consideration by the police.

11. Both internal and external lines of communication among law enforcement officers and agencies must be more adequately used. All intelligence information must be communicated to officers in the field. Existing inter-agency communication networks need to be more fully used by our department and by state and the other local agencies to share available information and planning particularly involving activities or events which appear to be related.

12. A state statute should be passed banning the possession, carrying or displaying of weapons (except by law enforcement personnel) within 500 feet of a parade or demonstration. The statute should also make it a crime to possess a weapon for the purpose of taking it to a parade or demonstration.

13. The City should enact an ordinance to control and restrict the carrying of weapons in parades and demonstrations, whether by participants, bystanders, or others, exclusive of law enforcement officers.

**Human Relations Commission Report, October 1980**

The HRC report, released in October of 1980 by the City of Greensboro’s Human Relations Commission, offered a summary and analysis of the findings of the Citizens Review Committee and the McManis Associates reports. While it acknowledged and included many of the Review Committee’s observations, its own interpretation was much more favorable to city officials and criticized in much harsher terms the actions of the CWP.

While it acknowledged the existence of and addressed ways to combat the city’s racial inequities in such areas as housing, employment and education, it placed the greatest blame for what happened on the “small band of Communist Worker’s Party members and Klansmen.”

*It is important to be aware of the ways in which many of our people-problems begin, and how the actions of a few infringe on the rights of many.*

Although it includes the Citizens Review Committee’s assertions that City officials at least “gave the appearance of engaging in a charade,” it still offers this praise: “City officials and the police were cooperative with the media in providing answers and/or explanations along with an open above board record of all events.”
In analyzing the events of November 3 and the days following, it is obvious that mistakes were made by some officials in the handling of certain sensitive issues. There is no evidence to indicate that City officials were not operating in good faith throughout the ordeal with protection of life and property uppermost in their minds.

The HRC report also highlighted city officials’ and the media’s distaste for outsiders.

The tragic event of November 3 and subsequent events that followed, have left a mark on Greensboro that will remain indelible for years to come. From the day of the first sit-ins up to the present, Greensboro has had its problems in dealing with matters concerning civil rights and human relations. Greensboro could very well become a target city for future activities of outside groups who wish to be seen and heard on a national level.

Our city must face up to this possibility and plan its strategy accordingly. It is time we begin directing our attention away from being fire-fighters, to becoming experts in fire prevention.

The HRC agreed in its report to some recommendations offered by its review committee, such as a need for the City to build more subsidized housing and to provide more supervised activities for older teens. “The city has made some recent attempts to address itself to some of the problems of the ‘low income’ citizen group,” the report said. “Further commitment needs to be encouraged.”

However, the report rejected other recommendations offered by the committee and by McManis Associates, who urged, among other things, that the police department “reconsider its recent organizational decision to split its Intelligence personnel into two separate units,” including a new Special Intelligence Section that 26 years later is implicated in the current police scandal (see below).

The HRC also rejected the Citizen’s Review Committee’s recommendation that an independent Citizens Advisory Board be established to oversee police conduct. The police did, however, reassign the community relations director to report directly to the chief of police on community attitudes. The GPD also promised that the new special intelligence section would cooperate better with other agencies and other units of the police department.

In response to the committee’s finding that the city needed to sponsor more programs giving black and white citizens the opportunity to interact, the HRC’s only response was to point to City plans to build a park in the largely black southeast quadrant of the city.

In its own recommendations and conclusions, the HRC said the City should make certain improvements in prohibiting discrimination in housing, employment and government spending including making equalizing “attempts” to “diminish the feelings that Dudley High School is not up to par with the others.” It also recommended the City “lead the way and encourage industry to follow in demonstrating a positive commitment to affirmative action by placing minorities in more managerial and decision-making positions thereby eliminating tokenism or the notion thereof.”

While it offered no recommendations or conclusions of its own related to the police department, it commended the City for implementing some of the McManis suggestions and for making progress “to correct certain policies and procedures for more efficient handling of problems.”

The HRC report acknowledged the City’s need to “win the confidence of its people” and “create a meaningful dialogue that seeks to resolve conflict. … the City must have patience with those who do not understand, and provide guidance and counsel for however long it may take.”
The Human Relations Commission’s report followed what many see as a pattern in Greensboro of scorning authentic self-examination in favor of cover-up and scapegoating. This was evident in the way the report downplayed criticisms of the City’s actions while focusing on the responsibility borne by the Klan, Nazis and CWP.

**HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS**

It is recommended:

1. That the City Council seek special local enabling legislation from the General Assembly to authorize the City of Greensboro to enact separate ordinances prohibiting discrimination in housing, employment and public accommodations.

2. Upon adoption of the above-mentioned ordinance that the duties of the Human Relations Commission should be expanded to provide that it may investigate, review, and conciliate specific complaints of discrimination in housing and employment which are in violation of these ordinances, and that either complaint procedure be included in that established City ordinance or the Commission be authorized to utilize the complaint procedure by amending the present ordinance.

3. The City of Greensboro should lead the way and encourage industry to follow in demonstrating a positive commitment to affirmative action by placing minorities in more managerial and decision-making positions thereby eliminating tokenism or the notion thereof.

4. That the City call upon all agencies and organizations using City tax dollars or operating under the endorsement of the City to become accountable for their activity, especially agencies and organization involved with preparing and promoting minority upward mobility.

5. That the City should take a leadership role in establishing meaningful dialogue of unity between the races, the various arms of government and the local citizenry.

6. That the City make better use of its educational institutions to monitor socioeconomic indicators.

7. That attempts be made to equalize equipment, facilities and educational programs at all Greensboro high schools to diminish the feelings that Dudley High School is not up to par with the others.

8. That the City review its position on the ward system and seek to come up with an acceptable recommendation that would provide for more effective representation.

9. That the community educational specialist be employed full-time as a Human Relations staff member who could communicate to the community various self-help programs and resources in addition to developing human relations training programs that could address the restive feelings among unemployed youth.

10. That a researcher be employed as a full-time staff member of the Human Relations Office to provide up-to-date data upon which sound decisions can be made to correct problems in housing, imbalances in employment and gather information that would foster good race relations.

11. That the City Council utilize the Human Relations Commission Talent Bank to establish wherein qualified persons who serve on boards and commissions would be screened for their potential contributions and that the respective boards and commissions have some input.
on the prospective members. Further, that major community organizations interested in the welfare and goodwill of the City and race relations be given an opportunity to nominate at least one member to the Human Relations Commission Talent Bank.

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Report, November 1980

Greensboro’s race relations were further examined under the auspices of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. That Commission’s North Carolina Advisory Committee took testimony from people representing Greensboro’s government, business, religious, educational and media communities, as well as representatives of local and national civil rights organizations, the Klan, the Nazis and City staff. Its report, “Black White Perceptions: Race Relations in Greensboro,” found a polarized city with “two diverging Greensboro societies: one with economic and political power and one which possesses neither.”

While making no attempt to present a detailed account of the actual shootings or to assess responsibility for what transpired on November 3, 1979, this report by the Commission’s Advisory Committee of North Carolina offers suggestions – largely from Greensboro residents themselves – on how black/white relations in Greensboro might be improved.

Among the people who spoke to the Committee:

- then-Mayor Jim Melvin, who decried the Klan, the CWP and “media coverage of the events in Greensboro which drew conclusions that race relations in Greensboro were poor and that discord and ill will abounded;”
- the late Dr. George Simkins and the late Ervin Brisbon, who both painted bleak pictures of local race relations and criticized the police performance;
- Nelson Johnson, who also criticized the police performance and objected to the Klan and Nazis being allowed to speak to the Committee to “further spread their poison;”
- William Snider, editor of the Greensboro Daily News and the Greensboro Record, who described a Greensboro that “encourages openness to new ideas and a sense of enlightenment and tolerance, is moderate in racial matters rather than liberal, and generally follows the course of courtesy and civility rather than confrontation and upheaval;” he also acknowledged that as a newspaperman he had responsibility in molding and shaping public opinion;
- Father George Kloster, pastor of St. Pius X Catholic Church, who echoed and crystallized others’ assessments:

According to Kloster, in Greensboro the power structure historically has been paternalistic in dealing with its problems – as best evidenced by the debate over the ward system of government. He believed the reluctance of city leadership to support a change in governmental structure, or even to acquiesce to change, reflects an attitude that certain people know what is best for everyone. ...

... Expressing his view that the city administration has lost credibility, he was specifically critical of the City’s handling of the February 2nd march ...

In summary, Father Kloster stated that Greensboro’s problems were similar to those found in other cities, but that overall the city does better than most places. He said, however, that Greensboro was not doing as well as in the past, and asserted that the city needs to be “more self-critical, more honest, perhaps a little less concerned about our image, (and) more concerned...
What happened after November 3, 1979?

That paternalism was evidenced in this quote from the HRC’s report, which—instead of tapping into and developing community leadership in neighborhoods such as Morningside Homes—called for keeping a closer eye on community members and keeping them away from outsiders:

*The Human Relations Commission has established a line of communication with the youth and adult groups of the various communities in an effort to be tuned into vibrations of unrest, as well as successes experienced by them. While many residents appear to be dormant, they may become easy targets to be manipulated by groups espousing propagandized half truths that may distort the real facts.*

The North Carolina Advisory Committee’s report recommended more “people-to-people contact and cooperative action” to solve the intertwined problems of economics and race; that the City Council enact a district election system and improve its affirmative action polices for recruiting, hiring and promotions in all City departments, including the police department, where it found that the “preponderance of minorities and females” were “in the lowest paid categories.”

**U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

*In Summary*

While a review of the statements summarized in this report reveals no consensus on the state of black/white relations in Greensboro, attitudes on just how good or bad these relations are do fall along racial lines. Greensboro citizens who are white emphasize the progress made. They see the Greensboro glass as more than half full. The city’s citizens who are black focused on the problems that remain, perceiving the glass to be almost empty.

The white and black citizens who gave information to the Advisory Committee seemed to be telling tales of two cities. Elected officials and most businessmen concentrated for the most part on the image of Greensboro. They presented selective evidence of racial progress: lack of violence for a decade, desegregation of the schools, and social and cultural interchange at the college level.

Standing aloof from the events of November 3, 1979, city officials and members of the establishment made frequent reference to “outside agitators” and attempted to balance off the extremist groups, the KKK and the Communists, who confronted one another in the “Morningside Homes Shootout.” The identification of the site with the killings, tended to imply involvement of the black residents from the housing project—although reportedly no current residents took part in the rally. The designation also seemed to insinuate that somehow “Morningside” was a remote place, not part of the Greensboro…

Findings:
The Greensboro community is comprised of many factions, separated by income, influence, education and race.

Recommendations:
Toward the ultimate goals of “diverse representation in city government” prescribed by the Citizens Review Committee, the North Carolina Advisory Committee recommends that the city administration maintain the CRC as a “civilian” adjunct to the Human Relations Commission. Such a group of persons,
themselves representing a cross section of Greensboro, would be invaluable in keeping communications open between the citizenry and the administration.

The Human Relations Commission, as the Citizens Review Committee suggests, should be given investigatory powers by the Greensboro City Council so that HRC can process, as well as receive, complaints and conduct meaningful reviews of community issues and concerns.

The Greensboro city administrators, City Council and the Human Relations Commission should seek the advice and counsel of other ad hoc citizen groups with professional backgrounds and living experience in particular areas – housing, education, employment, etc. – areas of concern to various segments of the city and to the greater community. Only through such people-to-people contact and cooperative action can the intertwined problems of economics and race be solved. …

Finding:
Members of minority groups are not adequately represented in city government.

Recommendations:
The Advisory Committee urges the City Council to enact a resolution calling for a district election system both for nominating and voting for candidates.

The Committee believes all residents of Greensboro should avail themselves of the city’s convenient voter registration and exercise their right to vote. …

Finding:
The preponderance of minorities and females employed by the Greensboro Police Department are in the lowest paid categories. Blacks and women are still underrepresented among higher ranked Department personnel.

Recommendation:
The Advisory Committee recommends that the Greensboro Personnel Department and Department of Public Safety seek more creative approaches to recruitment, training and upward mobility to overcome the underrepresentation and to meet the Department’s own goals and timetables. The overall objective is not merely to reach goals on a chart but to achieve a city police force that would be reflective of the populace and its interests in public safety and protection.

Post-Nov. 3, 1979, human relations

Nearly 26 years after the tragic Nov. 3, 1979, killings,

- Greensboro has a modified district system for city elections.
- Spending on city services is much less lopsided across quadrants of Greensboro.\textsuperscript{112}
- Dialogue across racial lines has benefited from efforts ranging from the now-defunct City Stage arts festival\textsuperscript{113} begun in 1980, to current Mayor Keith Holliday’s Mosaic Project, which matches white leaders with black leaders for informal, trust-building conversations.\textsuperscript{114}

However, fear and distrust in many segments of the community – especially of the GPD – linger since 1980.
What happened after November 3, 1979?

**Impacts of the City’s response**

In not taking seriously the Citizens Review Committee’s findings that city officials were viewed as “defensive,” “out of touch,” “repressive” and “insensitive” to many in the community, the city leadership has been doomed to repeat that history, which was evident at the start of the truth and reconciliation process.

When survivors of the Nov. 3, 1979, violence and community supporters of the process planned the 25th anniversary march under the slogan, “Facing our Past, Shaping our Future,” the police response was a reprise of the 1979 funeral march. The vast numbers of police lining the route re-emphasized the apparent perception in police circles of a false dichotomy of parade protection options: 1) absence or 2) intimidating overkill. Heedless of the lessons available from 1980, city police and government officials planned and executed security for the march that included an intimidating phalanx of officers in riot gear and a borrowed Highway Patrol helicopter circling in the sky above the peaceful marchers.

Similarly, in April 2005, over the vocal objections of its three black members, the City Council voted 6-3 to oppose the Commission’s work when representatives of the GTCRP presented over 5,000 signatures on a petition encouraging the City Council’s endorsement of the truth and reconciliation process. The Council’s discussion surrounding this decision and members’ concerns with their image afterwards was reminiscent of City responses to Nov. 3, 1979. Allen Johnson, editorial page editor for the News & Record wrote in a column following this decision:

> (T)he council, on the whole, still seems too concerned with image over substance, especially in the national media. “They didn’t hear all the information we got,” Councilman Don Vaughan said Thursday. They’ll just see that three African Americans voted one way and six whites voted the other, he said, and go off and report that “Greensboro is racially divided.”

> After all, got to keep up appearances...

> And maybe somewhere along the way someone will realize that if one meeting or one vote could racially split the community – if the state of our union is that fragile – we’re already divided.113

**City response to the GTRC**

Several other incidents with regard to the GTRC smacked of the old Community Relations Service’s tactics:

- Before the GTRC’s official announcement, someone in the GPD, city council or city manager’s office leaked to the *News & Record* that Klansman Virgil Griffin was to speak at the first public hearing, prompting an article raising concerns about security. The leak jeopardized Griffin’s participation as he had specifically requested that we keep it confidential so as not to attract too much press or protestors. In addition, some citizens say they stayed away from the hearing out of fear when they heard comments from council members implying that the GTRC was putting the city in danger. One council member compared the hearings to the violence in 1979 by saying, “We never wanted an incident then and we don’t want an incident now.” Another said, “I don’t understand what they’re doing to start with and don’t know what they want to gain… It’s nuts to me.” 114
- Police officials met with representatives of Mount Zion Baptist Church without GTRC staff
before the GTRC’s Community Dialogue. The police official responsible said that not inviting the GTRC staff was an oversight. Although police told church officials there was a chance the Klan would be present in robes, church officials said they never felt intimidated or frightened.

- Prospective statement givers and community dialogue participants indicated being discouraged to participate.
- Throughout the process, rumors have been spread by community leaders and others about the GTRC’s funding, its relationship to the GTCRP and allegations that the GTRC has “intimidated” statement givers who wished to express opinions and facts that might counter those held by people affiliated with the CWP.

These experiences, combined with the GPD surveillance of our executive director and broken file cabinets containing research, financial and personnel files, leads us to believe even more strongly that our process is relevant and important for revealing the deep brokenness in our community and leaders’ tendency toward suppression of truth-seeking and other efforts to insist on accountability. Although done in the name of protecting community stability, this end does not justify the means. Stability is not the same as justice, which must be established if the city hopes to restore trust and to heal.

**Conclusion**

With an approach since 1979 that has focused on controlling “the low-income citizens group” and isolating those with unpopular political views, the City created distrust in the community that lingers to this day in Greensboro. We share former Morningside Homes resident and community activist Tammy Tutt’s view that Greensboro would benefit from authentic dialogue on the community’s lingering pain, approached with respect for all people and all points of view.

> I think we need to submit ourselves to the truth. I think we need to commit to staying with it. I think we need to commit to hurting together. I think we need to commit to being angry without torturing ourselves and others for what our opinions and judgments have been over the last 30 years. I think we need to allow ourselves to flow as people so that healing can flow. And let people scream as loud as they need to and turn over all the tables that they need to. And people need to be able to shake their heads as much as they need to as long as they are hearing and accepting the truth. I think that we’re doing better because we’re at the table. We’re finally regurgitating a lot of things that have gone on inside. A lot of years that we’ve eaten that were not good for us that have been poisoning our systems. Whether we’re fussing and fighting or eating or whatever we’re doing at the table, we’re talking. Lots of good relationships in my opinion have been lost because people stopped talking.

> In 1979, racist people were able to come into a predominantly black community and launch an attack on people who were demonstrating in a peaceful way. And the community itself did not say a word. I can still see that happen today. I see crack houses, violent gun carriers, stores that sell drug paraphernalia, cigarettes sold to children, small grocery stores who sell forty ounces and no grocery or very little grocery, red lining in grocery stores or other businesses, boarding houses that are boarded up and not rented out. These are small and present attacks that are going on in communities today. And still the police are not doing anything. The city officials are still sitting by. And the community is not saying a word. When I call the police and say, “Can you come out and take care of a matter?” What they usually do is tell me what my part should be in the whole matter. I’m clear about what my part is and my part is actually inevitable, but where is your presence? Can I trust you? Can you come visit me and see me and hear me as a strong black woman and can you stop trying to conform me and make me what you feel I should be so my community can be right and
so I don’t have to call you? Can you hear me and stop judging me? Can you please not be my daddy? I think that we need to have a police review board that consists of grassroots community people, business people, city officials and fellow officers with subpoena power in order to hear the grievances that are going on in the community.  

FINDINGS

Following the trauma of the shootings, the City missed the opportunity to reassure its most vulnerable citizens that their government institutions would protect them and would conduct a rigorous investigation into what happened on Nov. 3, 1979.

Instead, the City’s response to the shootings sought to restore “stability” by repressing citizen protest through 1) an attempted ban on public demonstrations, 2) the attempted block of the widely supported Feb. 2, 1980, march by trying to book the Coliseum, 3) the use of CRS rumor mongering to intimidate and red-bait.

These government actions, coupled with the CWP’s own aggressive and isolationist actions and rhetoric, served to splinter progressive citizen response.

City officials often spoke publicly in the aftermath of Nov. 3, 1979, about their concerns about Greensboro being portrayed in the national and international media as a racially troubled city. Current city leaders still express similar concerns about Greensboro’s image with regard to this truth and reconciliation process.

Rather than using it as a tool for dialogue and healing, the Human Relations Commission effectively marginalized the report of the HRC-established Citizens Review Committee by dismissing findings and recommendations that were critical of the City and police.

In combination, these responses served to reinforce in the minds of citizens either that 1) the Communists were the real danger, or that 2) the City did not wish the real facts to be known and did not intend to protect its most vulnerable citizens.

Notes

5 City Manager Tom Osborne confirmed the insistence on the part of the city that the funeral march comply with their regulations, “The route will be the easiest for us to provide protection for both the marchers and the citizens … We will have all other routes blocked off, cordon. We are trying to make it impossible for any outsiders to break into the procession.” Quoted in “City to Insist March Follow Set Route,” Greensboro Record,
9 November 1979.

Police records of arrests around the funeral march list several charges of “violation of curfew.” Some have told us that the curfew was only enacted in black neighborhoods but we have not been able to substantiate that.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Martha Woodall, “Nov. 3 Results: Group Says Race Relations Here Need Look,” Greensboro Record, 18 December 1979, A1.

Ibid.

Candy Clapp, statement to the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Public Hearing, 26 August 2005. Although we have heard anecdotal evidence of a curfew placed on Morningside Homes residents following the violence on Nov. 3, 1979, we have not been able to corroborate those memories with any other written accounts.


Sally Avery Bermanzohn, Through Survivors’ Eyes (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2003), 243-244.

Pat Bryant, “Justice vs. The Movement,” Southern Exposure 8, no.2 (Summer 1980): 34.


Ibid., 31.

Ibid., 32.

Ibid., 32.


Daily deposition Waller v Butkovich, (12 October 1984), 35-37.


Ibid.

What happened after November 3, 1979?

38 Martha Woodall, “Group Planning Funeral March,” Greensboro Record, 6 November 1979.
40 “Follow Set Route,” Greensboro Record, 9 November 1979.
41 “Proclamation on State of Emergency,” issued by Mayor Melvin on 10 November 1979 at 3:00pm, Greensboro Daily News, 11 November 1979, A4.
42 Schlosser, “City in World Spotlight,” Greensboro Record, 10 November 1979; J. Schlosser, “Wall of Ho-Hum,” Greensboro Record, 15 November 1979 quoting Joyce Johnson on the street barricades resulting in low numbers of A&T students at the funeral march, “many others wanted to participate but couldn’t because they were barricaded on campus by police. There were looking down a gun barrel.”
45 “Persons Arrested and Weapons Confiscated,” GPD document, no date.
46 Irwin Smallwood, conversation with GTRC Communications Director Joya Wesley, Greensboro, December 2005.
48 Revolutionary Worker, 16 November 1979.
50 Revolutionary Worker, 16 November 1979.
51 Sally Avery Bermanzohn, Through Survivors’ Eyes (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2003), 249.
53 Gibson, interview with GTRC, 5 May 2006.
55 Revolutionary Worker, 16 November 1979.
57 Carolina Peacemaker editorial, Feb. 1980
66 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
80 Sally Avery Bermanzohn, *Through Survivors’ Eyes*, 260.
81 Ibid., 262.
90 Ibid, 37.
93 Human Relations Commissioners were: James Johnson (Chairperson), Thomas Ward, Jr. (Vice Chair), Ellen Adelman, Robert Albergotti, Josephine Brown, T.L. Jarman, Jerry Lawson, Linda McDougle, Richard Moore, Betty Mullin, Harold Odenwald, Robert Payne, Rabbi Arnold Task, James Van Hecke, Jr., and Dr. Robert Wilson. HRC staff included James Wright, II, Alexander Killens, Program Administrator, Jane Mabe, Jesse Brown, Jr., James Howard, IV, Warlena Lane and Yolanda Leacraft.
95 Ibid., 28.
96 Ibid., 18.
97 Ibid., 19.
99 Ibid., 26-27.
102 Ibid., 2.
103 Ibid., 5.
104 Ibid., 6-7.
105 Ibid., 8-9.
106 Ibid., 14-15.
107 Until 1983 all Greensboro City Council members were elected at large. This left many in the African American community and white residents living outside the city’s northwest quadrant feeling unrepresented.
108 Ibid., 17.
What happened after November 3, 1979?

110 Ibid., 24.
114 [http://www.ci.greensboro.nc.us/mosaic/](http://www.ci.greensboro.nc.us/mosaic/)
116 Eric Townsend, “Wizard in Klan to Speak at Hearing – list of people slated to address the truth panel this week will be released today,” *Greensboro News & Record*, 14 July 2005.